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Theory, ‘truthers’ and transparency: reflecting on 
knowledge in the 21st century
Introduction
The current era is often described in epistemic terms – as an ‘information age’ 
or ‘knowledge society’ in which progress might be achieved through such things 
as ‘transparency’ or ‘big data’.1 Such claims reflect deeply ingrained ideals and 
assumptions which are manifested in the attitudes and actions of international 
political actors, from international institutions seeking greater efficiency to 
individual citizens seeking empowerment. The ability of certain actors – 
especially government bureaucracies, security services, and private corporations 
– to gain access to and control of information whilst shielding themselves from 
the public gaze is increasingly a matter of concern. In this context, 
‘transparency’ is assumed to be a means of empowering the public by changing 
the informational balance of power. The sense of urgency surrounding such 
issues is particularly pronounced in relation to international politics, defined as it 
is by secrecy, uncertainty, and a lack of institutional accountability. 
As will be argued below, the overarching epistemic ideal at work here – the form 
of knowledge which is being promised, pursued, or hoped for – is that of 
unmediated access to information. An improved flow of information appears to 
promise more peaceful interaction, more effective governance, and greater 
accountability. This ideal cannot be understood in isolation from epistemic 
practices – that is, from the organised activity through which knowledge is 
actually created and pursued.2  Global governance increasingly depends on 
practices through which large amounts of data are created and circulated. At a 
popular level, there is awareness of the importance of data, and frustration when 
institutions fail to live up to the ideals of openness and transparency which they 
frequently propound. Such frustration gives rise to a range of activities aimed at 
accessing secret information or revealing hidden practices, ranging from 
campaigning by NGOs to unauthorised information ‘leaks’.  
1 Steve Fuller, The Knowledge Book, (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2007), p.82-87.
2 IR’s ‘practice turn’ has of course seen the concept of practice discussed at length in the 
discipline. However, it is beyond the scope of the present paper to consider the nature of 
practice in detail. ‘Epistemic practice’ will simply refer to actual behaviour directed towards the 
pursuit of knowledge. 
Having recognised the importance of epistemic matters some thirty years ago, 
and having done so with a view to exploring the connection between knowledge 
and power, Post-Positivist IR theorists should be well-equipped to investigate 
these developments. Post-Positivists introduced a mode of ‘reflexive’ theorising 
in which the epistemic assumptions of theorists were linked to the interests and 
practices shaping international politics.3 The use of the term ‘epistemic’ rather 
than ‘epistemological’ in this paper is intended to reflect this shift – knowledge is 
not approached primarily as a matter for philosophical enquiry but rather as one 
of ideals and practices which are partly constitutive of international reality. 
Despite this heritage, the future of reflection concerning epistemic matters in IR 
is in doubt. For many IR scholars, of course, it always represented a distraction 
from the real business of providing empirically-grounded accounts of 
international politics.4 However, similar assertions have recently re-emerged with 
‘eclecticist’ calls for an approach to IR based on ‘substantive’ or ‘concrete’ 
international political problems rather than investigation of theoretical 
controversies.5 From this perspective, discussions concerning the nature of 
knowledge are at best a distraction and at worst a form of superstition, to be 
compared to religious faith.6 Even those who maintain the need for reflexivity 
worry that the concern with epistemic matters might have hindered the 
development of a reflexivist research programme.7 In either case, the feeling is 
that rather too much attention has been paid to abstract epistemological and 
meta-theoretical questions at the expense of IR’s true purpose which is, not 
unreasonably, thought to be the production of accounts of international politics 
which have ‘cognitive impact’8 – that is, which increase our knowledge and 
understanding of events, structures, trends, and/or forces at work in the world.
Such doubts are understandable, but they are problematic if they hinder 
engagement with the constellation of epistemic assumptions, ideals, and 
3 Richard Ashley, ‘Political Realism and Human Interests’, International Studies Quarterly 25:2 
(1981), pp.204-236; Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory’, Millennium10:2 (1981), pp.126-155.
4 Robert Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, International Studies Quarterly 
32: 4 (1988), pp.379-396; William Wallace, ‘Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: theory 
and practice in international relations’, Review of International Studies 22:3 (1996), pp.301-321.
5 David Lake, ‘Theory is dead, long live theory: the end of the Great Debates and the rise of 
eclecticism in International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations 19: 3(2013), 
pp.567-587. 
6 Lake (2013), p.569.
7 Inanna Hamati-Ataya, ‘Reflectivity, reflexivity, reflexivism: IR’s ‘reflexive turn’ — and beyond’, 
European Journal of International Relations (2012), online first.
8 Hamati-Ataya (2012), p.2.
practices which are increasingly prominent in non-academic discussions of 
international politics. This paper seeks to demonstrate the importance of 
reflexive theory as a source of insight into contemporary world politics, and in 
particular into some of the epistemic ideals and practices which currently define 
it. It seeks to show that in reflecting, we need not move away from the world of 
concrete political problems but, potentially, further into the web of ideals and 
practices through which that world is constituted and experienced. Given the 
increasing prominence of epistemic concerns in international politics, this task 
is more important now than ever. 
In keeping with the goal of reconnecting reflexive IR with epistemic ideals and 
practices beyond academia, the paper takes as its starting point the ‘epistemic 
folkways’ which shape popular engagement with international politics. It focuses 
on two contemporary epistemic phenomena – the ideal of transparency, already 
mentioned above, and conspiracy theorising. The first half of the paper provides 
a historical sketch of the context in which the transparency ideal and conspiracy 
theorising emerged. Each reflects, in different ways, the widely accepted model 
of political interaction according to which it involves access to or control of 
information. In the case of transparency, the primary ideal is that of unobstructed 
access to information as a source of efficiency and empowerment. In practice, 
this entails attempts provide or gain access to information in pursuit of more 
effective and accountable governance. Like transparency, conspiracy theorising 
reflects a belief in the connection between hidden information and political power. 
However, in this case the goal is knowledge of hidden structures of power 
supposedly controlled by nefarious individuals or groups. The paper links the 
assumptions in question to the emergence of an epistemically self-conscious 
modernity with distinctive ‘technical’, ‘normative-political’, and ‘existential’ 
characteristics. 
However, if an account of epistemic folkways is to provide the insights which are 
demanded of reflexive IR theory, it is necessary to engage in reflection which 
goes beyond historicisation and beyond claims about the self-identified reflexivity 
of the modern West and its institutions. Part II of the paper argues that the pursuit 
of transparency and conspiracy theorising represent attempts to negotiate the 
relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. More specifically, and in less 
philosophical terms, individuals must respond to a situation in which they 
increasingly find themselves to have become objects of technical knowledge, but 
in a context where access to such knowledge is (in principle) open to any rational 
subject.  The subject-object relationship is a substantive political issue as well as 
a philosophical one, and ignoring it will diminish rather than enhance any insights 
generated by an investigation of epistemic ideals, concepts, and practices in 
international politics. Reflection concerning the subject-object relationship is 
particularly important since appeals to transparency and conspiracy themselves 
promote the impression of a shift – actual or potential – to a higher stage of 
development in which subjects are epistemically more empowered and 
sophisticated. The danger is that, on its own, the sort of history sketched in Part 
I of the paper simply confirms this story. 
The reflexive position in question is developed by drawing on the Critical Theory 
of Theodor Adorno, for whom reflection concerning the subject-object relationship 
was a means of understanding both the dilemmas of theory and the challenges 
of modern politics. Adorno was especially concerned about the pursuit of ‘false 
clarity’ or ‘immediacy’ and with the manifestation of this modern obsession in 
superstition, conspiracy theories, and transparency. Drawing on Adorno, it is 
argued that although they do reflect the increasing centrality of epistemic 
concerns to international politics, the epistemic phenomena under investigation 
are also signs of the dominance of a particular form of reified, technical 
knowledge.
I. Transparency and conspiracy in the historical perspective
Transparency, conspiracy, and epistemic folkways
The norms, practices, ideals, and assumptions through which knowledge is 
pursued and understood beyond academia might be described, following Alvin 
Goldman, as ‘epistemic folkways’.9 As suggested in the introduction, such 
‘folkways’ appear to be more relevant to international politics now than ever. Or 
perhaps more accurately (given that epistemic folkways must always have been 
significant to those following them), they currently appear with greater intensity 
and self-awareness than was previously the case. The two examples of 
transparency and conspiracy thinking reflect the extent to which epistemic ideals 
and practices shape popular engagement with international politics today. 
‘Transparency’ is perhaps the most influential of the overtly epistemic notions at 
work in contemporary international politics. It is generally understood to be a 
property of institutions which sees them grant outsiders (in most cases the public) 
9 Alvin Goldman, Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, (Boston MA: 
MIT Press, 1992). p.155. In contrast with Goldman, the term is not used here to imply a sharp 
separation of popular from philosophical accounts of knowledge or any hierarchical relationship 
between the two, but only as a means of adopting a socially grounded starting point for 
epistemic inquiry.
access to information about internal structures and procedures, thereby 
increasing their legitimacy and accountability. As a political ideal, it anticipates 
relations where such access is the norm. The ideal of transparency is of 
significant appeal in the context of complex structures of domestic and 
international governance operating with ever larger amounts of data. First used 
in a political context by Jeremy Bentham, the term is now entrenched in political 
discourse, with its advocates ranging from activists to international organisations, 
governments, and corporations.10
The ubiquity of appeals to ‘transparency’ in elite discourse and widespread 
attempts to pursue it in practice suggest that the ideal is of considerable appeal 
to those wielding international power. For example, the ‘Lough Erne Declaration’ 
which followed the 2013 G8 summit identified transparency as key to the success 
of private enterprise and good governance.11 Elsewhere, 65 governments – 
including the UK, France, US, Brazil, and South Africa – have signed-up to the 
multilateral Open Government Partnership which commits members to the 
pursuit of transparency in policy-making and public resource management. 
Signatories agree to take steps aimed at ‘engaging civil society and the business 
community to identify effective practices and innovative approaches for 
leveraging new technologies to empower people and promote transparency in 
government’.12 The pursuit of transparency also provides a means of allaying 
fears about political corruption. For example, a voluntary EU ‘Transparency 
Register’ lists approximately 6500 lobbying organisations operating in Brussels.13 
In some cases, governments, international institutions, and corporations work 
together in ‘transparency initiatives’. For example, the Extractive Industries 
10 Christopher Hood ‘Transparency in Historical Perspective’ in Christopher Hood and David 
Heald (eds.) Transparency: the Key to Better Governance?, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006) pp.3-23. References to transparency appear throughout Bentham’s writing. See for 
example Jeremy Bentham, ‘Jeremy Bentham to His Fellow-Citizens of France, on Houses of 
Peers and Senates’, in John Bowring (ed.) The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Volume 4 
(Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843a), pp.419-459, reference p.424; Jeremy Bentham 
‘Panopticon; or the Inspection House’, in John Bowring ed. The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 
Volume 4 (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843b), pp.37-172,  reference p.130.
11 ‘The Lough Erne Declaration’, available at: {https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g8-
lough-erne-declaration} accessed 18 December 2014.
12 Open Government Partnership, ‘Open Government Declaration’, available at: 
{http://www.opengovpartnership.org/about/open-government-declaration} accessed 15 
December 2014.  
13 European Commission, ‘The revised Transparency Register: more information, more 
incentives, tougher on those who break the rules’, available at: {http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-14-302_en.htm} accessed 15 December 2014.
Transparency Initiative (EITI) was created in 2003 following suggestions by the 
UK Government and has been supported by the IMF and World Bank.14
As these examples suggest, the appeal of transparency is especially strong in 
international politics, where structures for accountability have been in short 
supply. Under these conditions, its potential role as a form of ersatz international 
democracy is a key source of transparency’s appeal – it has become a means for 
institutions over which citizens feel they have little control to claim legitimacy and 
at least give the impression of accountability. It would, however, be a mistake to 
assume that transparency is simply a rhetorical tool of the powerful; the promise 
of transparency is widely accepted by those seeking, to varying degrees, to 
reform or challenge the prevailing structures of domestic and international power. 
Perhaps the best known is the anti-corruption organisation Transparency 
International, but there are hundreds of others working for local or global 
transparency.15 Most of these are concerned with anti-corruption initiatives, but 
the ideal of transparency has also been promoted by radical ‘transparency 
activists’ seeking to overturn existing structures of global power. For example, for 
Wikileaks transparency is a tool which might help citizens to ‘make their own 
history’.16 On this view, international politics is currently conducted on the basis 
of government secrecy which can be undermined by dragging secrets into the 
light, a strategy the most dramatic example of which is Wikileaks’ publication of 
thousands of US State Department cables in 2007.17
Whatever the political promise of transparency for elites or activists, a large if 
understandably less celebrated part of its appeal lies in the efficiency it promises 
to foster.18 If it is assumed that social, economic, and political interaction involves 
the circulation of information, transparency is potentially an important source of 
institutional efficiency and efficacy. This dimension of transparency moved to 
heart of the international system with the liberalisation of the global economy and 
14 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative website, available at: {https://eiti.org/eiti/history}, 
accessed 18 December 2014.
15 The Sunlight Foundation has compiled a list of over 500 transparency organisations, available 
at: 
{https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AoQuErjcV2a0dF85QTRRSEFtR3pfcjN4VHdw
LVYzSXc#gid=0} accessed 10 March 2015.
16 Wikileaks website, available at: {http://wikileaks.org/About.html} accessed 31 October 2013.
17 David Leigh and Luke Harding, Wikileaks: Inside Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy, (London: 
Guardian Books, 2011).
18 Matthew Fluck, ‘The Promise of Global Transparency: Between Information and 
Emancipation’, in Albena Azmanova and Mihaela Mihae (eds.) Reclaiming Democracy: 
Judgment, Responsibility and the Right to Politics, (New York: Routledge, forthcoming).
concomitant erosion of the norm of state controlled national economies.19 
Institutions such as the IMF emphasise the need for transparency partly to 
demonstrate their adherence to the ideal of public accountability but also because 
transparency is thought to be ‘a source of effective financial management’.20 The 
role of transparency as a source of systemic efficiency is not confined to the 
economic sphere. As has been noted by several IR scholars, transparency has 
also been important in the development of other international regime structures, 
such as those governing the environment, human rights, and arms control.21 This 
pursuit of the smooth functioning of a given sphere of activity by means of 
transparency extends to the interstate system. Already in the 18th century, 
Bentham was suggesting that provision of information was a means of avoiding 
international conflict.22 Today, politicians still emphasise the need for information 
to circulate freely in a healthy international system. In these cases, transparency 
is less about legitimacy or empowerment, and more to do with maintaining 
structures of governance through the circulation of relevant information to 
relevant actors.
The reasons for IR scholars to concern themselves with conspiracy theories are 
less immediately apparent. Conspiracy is certainly a common theme in popular 
culture and an obsession of large online communities such as 9/11 ‘truthers’, but  
conspiracy theorising can appear as pathological or marginal and therefore of 
little interest to political scientists or theorists. However, there are no sound 
reasons for dismissing it as a subject of investigation out of hand.23 Firstly, under 
19 Hongying Wang and James Rosenau, ‘Transparency International and Corruption as an 
Issue of Global Governance’, Global Governance 7 (2001), pp.25-49.
20 International Monetary Fund, ‘Fiscal Transparency, Accountability, and Risk’ (August 2012), 
available at: {http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/080712.pdf} accessed 1 September 
2013. 
21 Roland B. Mitchell, ‘Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes’ 
International Studies Quarterly, 42: 1 (1998), pp.109-130; Ann Florini, ‘The End of Secrecy’, in 
Bernard Finel and Kristen M. Lord (eds.) Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 13-28.
22 Jeremy Bentham, ‘A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace’, in John Bowring (ed) The 
Works of Jeremy Bentham Volume 2, (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843c), pp.546-561. 
23 Surprisingly little has been written about conspiracy theories in IR, but see Luke Herrington, 
‘Beyond Boston: Conspiracy Theories and International Relations’, e-IR Blog, available at: 
{http://www.e-ir.info/2013/04/16/beyond-boston-conspiracy-theories-and-international-relations/} 
accessed 12 November 2013; J Dana Stuster,‘The Boston Marathon Conspiracy Theories 
Start‘, Foreign Policy Blog, (15 April 2013), available at:  
{http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/04/15/the_boston_marathon_conspiracy_theories_star
t?wp_login_redirect=0} accessed 12 November 2013; Stefanie Ortmann and John Heathershaw 
‘Conspiracy theories in the post-Soviet space’, The Russian Review, 71:4 (2012),  pp. 551-564.
some circumstances, conspiracy theories have been extremely influential. 
Throughout the twentieth century elites fostered conspiracy theories in order to 
justify and rally popular support for attacks on their opponents. Perhaps most 
famously, Richard Hofstadter’s classic work on the ‘Paranoid Style in American 
Politics’ describes the McCarthy-era obsession with Communist conspiracy 
which came to dominate American politics.24 Earlier, in Germany, claims about a 
Communist plot following the Reichstag fire had helped the Nazis to consolidate 
their power. The Soviets had their own uses for such paranoia – the Stalinist 
show trials in the 1930s took place in the context of claims about counter-
revolutionary conspiracies.25 
Even where it is not accepted at an elite level, conspiracy theorising is clearly of 
broad popular appeal, reflecting a set of epistemic folkways through which large 
numbers of individuals interpret international events. Polls frequently reveal that 
a substantial proportion of people are sympathetic to such conspiracy theories. 
One recent poll suggests that as many as 28 per cent of American voters believe 
in a ‘globalist conspiracy’ to establish a ‘new world order’ and 37 per cent that 
global warming is a hoax.26 9/11 conspiracies still abound. And conspiracy 
thinking is by no means an American phenomenon (a common misconception). 
One 2003 survey suggested that 1 in 5 Germans believed that the US 
government was behind the 9/11 attacks.27 Conspiracy theories are widespread 
in the Middle East and former Soviet Union.28 As the elite conspiracy theorising 
of the twentieth century shows, such modes of thinking can have significant 
political implications. 
Even where such thinking does remain on the fringes, the assumption that 
examination of marginal phenomena can only provide insights which are of little 
significance is questionable. In fact, the widespread and often unreflexive 
acceptance of ideals like transparency by policymakers and researchers is in 
some respects a disadvantage, serving to obscure the array of assumptions – 
24 Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, (New York: Vintage, 2008).
25 David Aaronovitch, Voodoo Histories: How Conspiracy Theory Has Shaped Modern History, 
(London: Vintage, 2009).
26 Public Policy Polling, ‘Conspiracy Theory Poll Results’, 2013, available at: 
{http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/main/2013/04/conspiracy-theory-poll-results-.html} accessed 
12 November 2013. 
27 Peter Knight, ‘Outrageous conspiracy theories: popular and official responses to 9/11 in 
Germany and the United States’ New German Critique, 103: Winter (2008), pp.165-193, 
reference p.165.
28 Ortmann and Heathershaw (2012); Matthew Gray, Conspiracy Theories in the Arab World: 
Sources and Politics, (London: Routledge, 2010).
philosophical and political – which, as we will see, lie behind them. In contrast, 
apparently pathological or extreme phenomena can provide a means of 
approaching more widespread patterns, structures, or assumptions from new 
angles.29 
Much like transparency, conspiracy theories depend on and reproduce epistemic 
folkways through which actors engage with or hope to engage with world politics. 
In fact, as will be argued below, the epistemic folkways involved in each case are 
similar in important respects. Like the ideal of transparency, conspiracy thinking 
is of especial appeal in a world which appears to be shaped by the circulation of 
abundant information but in which political and social structures nevertheless 
remain obscure and unresponsive. In keeping with the desire to make visible a 
hidden wealth of politically relevant information, and in much the same way as 
transparency advocates emphasise the importance of information, conspiracy 
theories draw heavily  on  quasi-scientific  appeal  to  facts  and  experts,  albeit  
those  which  are  ignored  by  the ‘mainstream’. For example, in a piece entitled 
‘The Facts Speak for Themselves’ one 9/11 ‘truther’ site lists fifty ‘facts’ about the 
events of September 11 2001.30 Elsewhere, the testimony of ‘experts’ is seized 
upon to imbue theories with legitimacy.31 At the same time, the structures of 
oppression which are supposedly identified reflect the rational actions of 
malevolent groups or individuals who can control access to information. 
Both the transparency ideal and conspiracy thinking reflect, then, significant and 
related aspects of current epistemic folkways. These modes of thinking are 
related in important ways to international political practice. This is most obvious 
in the case of transparency, which appeals both to organisations which depend 
on the creation and circulation of information and to citizens who hope to 
influence them. However, conspiracy thinking is a common response to the 
opacity and complexity of international affairs. The apparent indifference of 
international actors and institutions and the unresponsiveness of the structures 
of global governance make conspiracy theorising in some respects a rational 
response for those who think that transparency will not come easily. In each case 
knowledge is thought to involve access to previously hidden data, facts, or 
information. With transparency, citizens gain access to information held by key 
institutions. Conspiracy theorists, on the other hand, act as collectors of 
29 Jodi Dean, Aliens in America, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p.7.
30 Jon Gould, ‘The Facts Speak for Themselves’, available at: {911truthnews.com/the-facts-
speak-for-themselves/} accessed 20 August 2013. 
31 See e.g.  Architects and Engineers for 9/11 Truth, available at: {http://www.ae911truth.org/} 
accessed 15 December 2014.
supposedly hidden facts about the machinations of the powerful. These epistemic 
assumptions are tied to assumptions about the nature of political interaction, 
which are in some cases shared at a popular and elite or institutional level. In 
particular, it is assumed that a significant proportion of political interaction 
consists of the accumulation, circulation, or protection of information by atomistic 
actors. Access to information is assumed to be empowering, although the 
mechanisms through which such knowledge leads to political influence are rarely 
articulated in any detail by either the advocates of transparency or conspiracy 
theorists. As will be argued towards the end of the paper, this omission is no 
coincidence.
Historicising transparency and conspiracy
Reflexivists seem to be especially well-placed to illuminate these epistemic 
folkways and their international political significance. ‘Reflexivity’ is an ambiguous 
term in IR, referring to a range of theories and having several applications.32 
However, a key contribution of reflexive theorising has been to cast critical light 
on epistemic frameworks which are usually taken for granted, but which are partly 
constitutive of political reality.33  These are structures in which scholars 
themselves participate. Thus, as explained by Mark Neufeld, reflexive theory is a 
metatheoretical stance which generates awareness of the constitutive role of 
knowledge within social activities and ‘recognition of the inherently politico-
normative content of paradigms and the normal science traditions’ in which 
scholars participate.34 Reflexivist IR scholars have considered in detail the links 
between politics and knowledge, and they have done so in such a way that 
knowledge is not a matter of academic epistemology but of social and political 
epistemic ideals and practices. 
One of the simplest but most effective strategies of reflexive IR theory has been 
that of historicisation, which serves to denaturalise and contextualise widespread 
32 Hamati-Ataya (2012); Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International 
Relations, (London: Routledge, 2011), esp. Ch.6; Brooke Ackerly and Jacqui True, ‘Reflexivity 
in Practice: Power and Ethics in Feminist Research on International Relations’, International 
Studies Review 10: 4 (2008), pp.693–707; Keohane (1988); Christian Bueger, ‘From 
epistemology to practice: a sociology of science for international relations’ Journal of 
International Relations and Development 15:1 (2012), pp.97-109; Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, 
‘Advancing a Reflexive International Relations’, Millennium 39:3 (2011), 809-823.
33 Jackson (2011), p.160.
34 Mark Neufeld ‘Reflexivity and International Relations Theory’, Millennium 22:1 (1993) pp.53-
76, reference p.55.
ideals and practices and to emphasise the mutability of the social world, including 
the epistemic folkways upon which it might depend.35 Widely accepted norms or 
standards such as transparency, the advantages of which might appear to be 
obvious, are revealed to be the products of a particular time and place and of 
underlying social forces. That which, like conspiracy theorising, seems marginal 
or anomalous can be linked to wider social structures or trends, providing insights 
into what Vico described as the ‘modifications of human mind’.36 The strategy of 
historicisation has been at the heart of critical Post-Positivist IR from its inception, 
and has generally been directed against the strictures of Realism.37 For example, 
Andrew Linklater has employed it in his explorations of shifting forms of moral 
community.38 Robert Cox identifies historicisation as a key feature of Critical 
Theory and employs it to explore shifting configurations of ideas, institutions, and 
social forces in world politics.39 Such a strategy provides a useful first step in the 
present attempt to illuminate contemporary epistemic folkways. By means of 
historicisation it is possible to provide a sketch of the relationship of such folkways 
to a wider constellation of epistemic ideals and practices as well as to historical 
trends in international politics. This sketch will provide the basis for further 
reflection in the second part of the paper.
In broad terms, the prominence of transparency and conspiracy thinking appears 
to reflect the extent to which modern political practices, ideals, and experience 
have been shaped by the reflexive character of Western modernity. The 
prominence of epistemic ideals and anxieties in popular engagements with 
international relations is in part a product of the fact that modernity has defined 
itself through reflexive awareness – self-knowledge – of its own processes, 
including those involving the generation and distribution of knowledge.40 Western 
societies have reproduced themselves partly by epistemic and reflexive means, 
but also with ideals through which certain epistemic standards and practices have 
been elevated. Information about populations and their environment is collected 
but also knowledge about the systems for collecting that information.41 With this, 
progress has come to be defined accordingly in terms of accurate and useful 
knowledge accumulated in ever more sophisticated ways. As transparency 
35 John Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations’, 
International Organisation 47: 1 (1993), pp.139-174; Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the 
Theory of International Relations, (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1982); Cox (1981).
36 Quoted in Cox (1981), p.132. 
37 Linklater (1982); Cox (1981).
38 Linklater (1982).
39 Cox (1981).
40 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, (Cambridge: Polity, 1991).
41 Giddens (1991). 
discourse and conspiracy thinking show, such epistemic definitions of progress 
and empowerment, whether collective or individual, can take a variety of forms 
and can appeal to a range of actors.
This form of society has been described in a different ways by scholars including 
Michel Foucault, Jurgen Habermas, Ulrick Beck, and Anthony Giddens.42 As 
Foucault shows, the shift to such a mode of social organisation is, in many 
respects, one to the will to knowledge or truth itself.43 Habermas’s claim that ‘if 
we imagine the philosophical discussion of the modern period as a judicial 
hearing, it would be deciding a single question: how is reliable knowledge 
possible?’ not only tells us about philosophy, but about the ideals and practices 
of modernity in general.44 It betrays something of the sense of impending 
epistemic crisis that pervades societies built around the idealisation of knowledge 
– that reliable knowledge might escape us or, as Habermas fears, that an 
unsatisfactory answer to the question of reliability might be imposed. This fear 
that the knowledge upon which modernity supposedly depends will ultimately 
escape us is central to the idealisation of transparency and the obsessions of 
conspiracy theorists. 
In sketching a history of epistemic modernity it will be useful to distinguish 
between three spheres. The context for the emergence of transparency and 
conspiracy has been: the emergence of technical knowledge based on the 
creation, control, and circulation of information concerning objective reality; the 
normative-political rise of ideals and practices according to which no relevant 
actor is excluded unnecessarily from access to knowledge or participation in its 
production; and the existential significance for individuals who are at once objects 
of technical knowledge and knowing subjects – items of data, receivers of 
information, and interpreting members of the public.45 
At the level of technical knowledge, forms of governance which emphasise 
scientific or other expertise have played an increasingly significant role in modern 
international relations. Scholars such as Peter Haas have identified the central 
42 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, (London: Penguin, 1977); Jurgen Habermas, 
Knowledge and Human Interests (London: Heineman, 1972); Giddens (1991); Ulrick Beck, Risk 
Society (London: Sage, 1992).
43 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1 (London: Penguin, 1990).
44 Habermas (1972), p.3. Habermas’s concern is not that this question is no longer asked, but 
that the answer is assumed to be provided by science.
45 These are employed here analytical devices rather than fundamental knowledge constitutive 
interests of the kind identified by Habermas.
role of communities of scientific experts in international relations.46 John Ruggie 
has described how international epistemic communities of experts develop 
around epistemes, a label for the ‘dominant way of looking at social reality, a set 
of shared symbols and references, mutual expectations and a mutual 
predictability of intention’.47 In fact, the emergence of modern science and 
statistics is closely linked to the development of modern statecraft – Armand 
Mattelart describes how ‘statistics’ was originally defined as ‘state science’. 48 
Whilst new forms of mathematical and scientific reasoning were of significant 
military use,49 the 18th century also witnessed the emergence of the idea that the 
availability of information would enable cooperation and ultimately tend to make 
international relations more peaceful. As mentioned above, the latter idea is 
already apparent the work of Bentham, who identified ‘information’ as a key 
means of overcoming the conflictual nature of the system of states.50 
Technical progress did not occur simply through the accumulation of facts and 
the elevated role of experts, but also involved collective or individual self-
knowledge and the self-scrutiny and refinement of epistemic process and 
infrastructures themselves.51 This is apparent in Bentham’s now infamous 
proposal for the ‘Panopticon’, an institution in which nothing of the behaviour of 
the inhabitants of the system or its operation was concealed from those managing 
it or from the wider public.52 In Bentham’s system, information circulates, but in a 
controlled manner; prisoners are held in cells where they can be constantly 
observed and their perception of their environment tightly controlled.53 This 
controlled production and circulation of information is combined with reflection, 
from the self-monitoring behaviour of the inmates to the management’s 
awareness that they too are being observed.54 Bentham’s system reveals that 
the technical role of such transparency is not just a matter of ensuring access to 
46 Peter Haas, ‘Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination’ 
International Organisation (1992) 46:1.
47 John Ruggie, ‘International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends’ International 
Organization 29:3 (1975), pp.557-583, reference pp.560-61; Haas (1992), pp.26-27.
48 Armand Mattelart, The Information Society: An Introduction, (London: Sage, 2003), pp.12-13.
49 Mattelart (2003), pp.14-15.
50 Bentham (1838-1843c); Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, (New York: W W Norton, 
1997), p.226.
51 Giddens (1991), p.21
52 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Panopticon; or the Inspection House’ in The Works of Jeremy Bentham 
Volume 4, edited by John Bowring. (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843b).  
53 Bentham (1838-1843b).
54 Bentham (1838-1843b); Foucault (1977), p.204.
relevant facts but also of maintaining effective systems with minimum effort – the 
efficiency and efficacy mentioned above.55 
This applies to the system of states as much as any other. For example, it has 
been suggested that transparency played a role in the peace which accompanied 
the Concert of Europe.56 Frequent communication and increased openness 
between the European powers allowed for more peaceful interaction and, for a 
while, a more stable international system.57 In the second half of the 20th century, 
transparency was especially important in the emergence of security cooperation, 
helping to increase confidence by reducing the possibilities for ‘cheating’.58  It was 
central to arms control agreements, which involved various ‘verification’ 
measures to ensure compliance. International transparency has even been 
characterised as arms control’s contribution to international politics.59 On this 
view, transparency is not only useful to individual states, but also ensures the 
smooth functioning of the systems in which they interact.60
The appeal of transparency arose not only from its role in aiding the circulation of 
information in pursuit of technical goals. The shift to a new form of technical 
knowledge was accompanied by new standards of authority and legitimacy and, 
ultimately, by new forms of power. In particular, the development of such 
knowledge required that epistemic status be detached from traditional forms of 
authority.61 In international relations, the shift is reflected in that from esoteric 
rationales for state secrecy, according to which individuals are precluded from 
knowing on the basis of their social status, to technical ones, according to which 
secrecy occurs where it is necessary for the effective pursuit of particular goals.62 
In the 18th century, Frederick II of Prussia could still declare that ‘a private person 
has no right to pass public and even disapproving judgment…  on sovereigns 
55 Ann Florini, ‘A new role for transparency’ Contemporary Security Policy 18:2 (1997), pp.51-
72, reference p.52.
56 Dan Lindley ‘Avoiding tragedy in power politics: the Concert of Europe, transparency, and 
crisis management’, Security Studies 13:2 (2003), pp.195-229.
57 Lindley (2003).
58 Robert Jervis, ‘From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation.’ In 
Bernard I. Finel and Kristin M. Lord (eds.) Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp.29-56.
59 Florini (1997), p.51.
60 Lindley (2003), p.228.
61 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, (Cambridge: Polity, 
1989).
62 Siselia Bok, Secrets, (New York: Pantheon, 1982), p.172.
and courts…  or to publish in print pertinent reports that he manages to obtain’. A 
‘private person’ – at this time anyone not associated with the court – was 
forbidden from doing so since he or she was ‘not at all capable of making such 
judgment, because he lacks complete knowledge of the circumstances and 
motives’.63 There was a connection between social status and the ability to 
engage in politically relevant epistemic activity. Of course, contemporary 
governments still assert the need to protect state and corporate secrets. 
However, contemporary parallels with earlier forms of power are to some extent 
misleading. Assertions of the need for government secrecy are increasingly 
combined with a modern politics of knowledge according to which information 
can be, at least in principle, ‘handled’ by all relevant actors. In this new world, the 
latter can in principle be any citizen of the state in question. Thus, even 
previously top secret documents are eventually released to the public, albeit after 
several decades and often with considerable official obstruction.64 Even where 
secrecy is ruthlessly defended, secret information can circulate to vast numbers 
of relevant actors. For example, approximately 5 million individuals – government 
employees and private contractors – have access to secret or top secret 
documents in the United States.65 
The change in question was a normative-political as well as technical one. 
Accompanying it was the increasing expectation that validity claims be justified 
beyond the aristocracy to a public consisting of rational actors. This principle was 
key to Kant’s political theory. Kant was concerned with the procedure through 
which political claims are subjected to the test of publicity, a sort of communal 
reflection, arguing that any political maxim which cannot survive public scrutiny 
is not in keeping with political right.66 This is the political parallel of the moral 
reasoning which he promoted, through which maxims are reflexively tested for 
contradiction.67 Whilst this sort of Kantian reflection is not epistemic in a narrow 
63 Habermas (1989), p.25.
64 Recent examples include documents relating to British colonial forces torture of civilians in 
Kenya and the CIA’s role in the coup against Mossadegh in Iran.
65 Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2013), ‘2012 Report on Security Clearance 
Determinations’, available at: {https://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/intel/clear-2012.pdf} accessed 
20 February 2014.
66 Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’ in Hans Reiss (ed.)Kant’s Political Writings, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp.93-130, ref.125-130. As Habermas explains, the public 
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sense it does present the public sphere as a mechanism for testing validity.68 The 
modern public cannot be left ignorant; authority is replaced by reflection, society 
scrutinises itself. 
As modern international systems and institutions have been built around 
technical knowledge and the creation and circulation of information, the 
possibilities and demand for public reflection concerning international matters 
have increased.69 States and citizens are increasingly confronted by forces such 
as environmental degradation or economic breakdown which transcend borders 
and, just as they demand cooperative technical responses, increase the pressure 
for transnational political cooperation. Moreover, the international institutions 
created to address such issues themselves become part of the international 
reality with which individuals are confronted.  As Ruggie has noted, the extension 
of technical knowledge generates new subjects of political choice and in turn the 
recognition that a collective situation – ‘policy interdependence’ – exists.70 As well 
as new forms of interaction between states, this can generate the sense that there 
is an embryonic global public which is faced with such issues.71 This can in turn 
trigger demands for new forms of transnational political interaction, including 
those which involve sharing information with ordinary citizens.72 
Such global public deliberation would be distinct from technical knowledge. 
However, as suggested above, we should not lose sight of the overlap between 
the two. Transnational publicity requires public access to information and this 
information will generally be the product of technical activity. Such access is 
increasingly demanded and increasingly achievable, whether with the consent of 
the creators or owners of information or via ‘leaking’. Moreover, just as technical 
practices require the creation of data from complex social reality, new forms of 
publicity involved the elevation of some supposedly universal forms or 
68 Kant writes that ‘The touchstone whereby we decide whether our holding a thing to be true is 
conviction or mere persuasion is therefore external, namely the possibility of communicating it 
and finding it to be valid for all human reason’. Quoted in Habermas (1989), p.108. In other 
words, publicity is a ‘pragmatic test of truth’.
69 See e.g. Nancy Fraser, ‘Transnationalizing the Public Sphere’, Theory, Culture, Society 24: 4 
(2007), pp.7-30; Andrew Linklater The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical 
foundations of the post-Westphalian era, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
70 Ruggie (1975), pp.560-61.
71 This was arguably the case with the ‘anti-globalisation’ movements which emerged in the late 
twentieth century.
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dimensions of subjectivity and the suppression of others. This is apparent if we 
remember the specifically bourgeois, patriarchal, and Western origins of the 
modern public sphere.73 The interaction between the two spheres is further 
apparent if we consider the ways in which the development of new scientific 
instruments has spurred-on normative-political discussions in which changing 
ideas about the nature of knowledge have been linked to struggles over social 
and political power. For example, innovations in Optics in late 18th and early 19th 
century France were closely linked to discussions about political transparency, 
and in turn to debates between conservatives and progressives concerning the 
nature of political power and authority.74 
Whilst IR scholars have long been aware of the significance of the epistemic in 
international politics, the epistemically charged nature of popular engagement 
with the international is increasingly apparent. Most citizens are at least partly 
conscious of the epistemic dimension of international relations. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, in the context outlined above, in seeking to address political 
questions about legitimacy and power which have an impact on their lives, they 
turn to epistemic ideals as a potential source of empowerment or progress. The 
hope is that access to knowledge will bring empowerment and insight in relation 
to structures and institutions which are currently unresponsive and obscure. This 
combination of the individual and the social, the ideal and the practical, the 
technocratic and the normative makes epistemic matters a site of tension and 
anxiety. Near universal popular faith in transparency depends in part on 
acceptance of the view that social and political interaction depend on data or 
information, as evidenced by widespread concerns about the importance of 
‘personal data’ and the need to protect it. In the face of apparently remote and 
unresponsive institutions, transparency promises political by means of epistemic 
empowerment and is closely linked to belief in the progressive power of publicity. 
Access to information appears to promise a route to the inner workings of political 
institutions, and thereby to power and influence. 
The thwarted hope for such access constitutes part of the context for conspiracy 
theorising. In this case, little faith is placed in the mechanisms of transparency 
developed in modern societies. Confronted with institutions, structures, and 
systems which are obscure and threatening, but armed with modern faith in the 
emancipatory power of knowledge, conspiracy theorists pursue the facts in ways 
which avoid the paths offered by governing institutions or the mainstream public 
73 Habermas (1989).
74 Theresa Levitt, The Shadow of Enlightenment: Optical and Political Transparency in France 
1789-1848, (Oxford: OUP, 2009).
sphere. However, at another level conspiracy thinking reflects the emergence of 
wider epistemic folkways which emphasise the importance of data and its 
circulation. In this context, the hope that the determined citizen can, through 
dogged pursuit of the facts, find the truth which is ‘out there’ and which powerful 
forces would withhold from her is paramount. As Hofstadter explains,
[t]he typical procedure of the higher paranoid scholarship is to start with such defensible 
assumptions and with a careful accumulation of facts, or at least of what appear to be facts, and 
to marshal these facts toward an overwhelming ‘proof' of the particular conspiracy that is to be 
established.75 
At this point it is useful to consider a third feature of the modern epistemic-
reflexive constellation identified above – its constitutive but problematic relation 
to individual subjects. As Giddens points out, reflection is an existential as well 
as a social matter – for members of modern societies, questions about the ‘basic 
parameters of human life’ are posed and answered reflexively.76 Foucault and 
Habermas have both linked the emergence of modern epistemic frameworks to 
the development of the self. The latter places the newly emerged public and the 
modern subject side by side: ‘The publicum developed into the public, the 
subjectum [developed] into the subject, the receiver of regulations from above 
into the ruling authorities’ adversary’.77 Foucault pointed to the relationship 
between self-reflection and the development of both more efficient ways of 
exercising power and the care of the self.78 In IR, Ruggie has discussed the 
significance of the emergence of the ‘I form’ and single fixed point perspective for 
the development of modern territorial states.79 Richard Ashley’s account of 
‘heroic practice’ draws a similar connection between the modern epistemic 
stance, individual identity, and modern sovereignty.80
The epistemic folkways apparent in transparency and conspiracy reflect the way 
in which individuals find themselves simultaneously in the role of objects of a 
particular kind of technical knowledge, having been reduced to data, but also in 
that of potentially knowing subjects who seek access to that data and the 
structures in which it circulates. With the addition of this relationship, the reasons 
for the intensity of interest in transparency and conspiracy are further apparent. 
The modern experience of being an object of knowledge or being confronted by 
75 Hofstadter (2008), pp.36-37.
76 Giddens (1991), p.55.
77 Habermas (1989), p.26.
78 Foucault (1977), pp.201-204; Foucault (1990).
79 Ruggie (1993), pp.158-160.
80 Richard Ashley, ‘Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy 
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technical or scientific practices which apparently fail to serve one’s interests or 
respond to one’s demands is potentially a source of alienation to which 
conspiracy thinking and appeals to transparency are responses.81 This 
experience will be particularly pronounced for those confronted with structures of 
global governance or power in which mechanisms of accountability, if they exist 
at all, are weak or indirect. In this context, taking the role of a knowing subject 
who is in theory equal to all others represents an appealing response. However, 
for it to be so, it is necessary that political activity, whether oriented to the 
technical maintenance of systems of governance, public scrutiny of those 
structures, or individual empowerment in relation to them, is understood partly in 
terms of access to and circulation of information. Thus, whilst, the strands of 
modern epistemic activity identified here – technical, normative-political, and 
existential – are useful ideal types, it would be a mistake to distinguish too sharply 
between them.  
II. Subjectivity and objectivity in theory and in practice
Subject and Object 
Whilst it is useful to link current epistemic folkways to wider historical trends, the 
implication that the story of modernity can be told in terms of the shift to a new 
epistemic stage is problematic. This is, after all, a narrative which transparency 
discourse and conspiracy thinking themselves draw upon and reproduce. Implicit 
in each is the idea of a progression, however difficult, towards an epistemically 
and therefore politically more sophisticated society or subjectivity. Faith in 
transparency reflects the belief that the particular form of knowledge represented 
by access to information is politically empowering. Conspiracy theorising reflects 
considerably less optimism, but nevertheless tends to involve the assumption that 
politics is a conscious epistemic struggle in which nefarious and powerful actors 
deliberately maintain the ignorance of the masses. For the conspiracy theorist, 
the truth is ‘out there’ to be triumphantly uncovered by the determined individual. 
The self-consciously epistemic nature of transparency and conspiracy presents 
a particular challenge for IR theorists seeking cognitive impact in the supposed 
‘information age’ – in providing an account of modernity in terms of epistemic 
changes, the theorist risks obscuring the tensions, contradictions, and occlusions 
which might accompany the tale in question. The danger is that of uncritically 
81 Dean (1998), p.8.
accepting the claim that modern politics simply is epistemic in the ways described 
above, thereby diminishing any critical insights that an account of epistemic 
folkways in contemporary international politics might provide. The challenge is 
therefore that of finding some way of rubbing epistemic history ‘against the 
grain’.82
This blurring of the line between theory and political reality points to a familiar but 
more fundamental problem concerning the possibility of separating subject and 
object in IR theory. With the introduction of the subject-object relationship we 
appear to set foot on precisely the metatheoretical detour which critics of 
supposed reflexivist abstraction fear. However, our brief investigation of 
epistemic folkways indicates that this is not simply an academic problem. As we 
have just seen, the technical, normative-political, and existential dimensions of 
epistemic activity apparent in transparency and conspiracy can be explained 
partly in terms of the interaction between objectification and subjectification. 
Actors engage in practices of objectification whilst, as we have seen, participating 
in the construction of particular forms of subjectivity from the perspective of which 
objectification is possible. In the hands of citizens, transparency and conspiracy 
are attempts to engage with and take control of the ways in which the subject-
object relationship is negotiated in practice. Contrary to assertions that such 
matters are a distraction from concrete political problems, therefore, the subject-
object relationship is of substantive political importance. Ignoring it will diminish 
rather than enhance any insights generated by an investigation of epistemic 
ideals, concepts, and practices in international politics. The task facing IR 
theorists is that of negotiating subjectivity and objectivity themselves whilst 
seeking to develop critical knowledge of social world in which actors are doing 
the same. 
In the remainder of this paper it will be argued that the resources for pursuing this 
task and thereby building on the historical sketch outlined above can be found in 
the Critical Theory of Theodor Adorno. Reflection on the subject-object 
relationship to illuminate modern epistemic folkways, on the on the one hand, and 
the dilemmas of theory, on the other, lies at the heart of Adorno’s work. In order 
to illuminate the modern constellation of epistemic ideals and practices along with 
their political implications – that is, in order to achieve the ‘cognitive impact’ and 
insight into ‘substantive problems’ which is now being demanded of Post-
Positivist IR – Adorno reflexively subverts the subject-object distinction and with 
it the assumptions about epistemic progress central to the self-understanding of 
82 Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ in Hannah Arendt ed. Illuminations 
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Western modernity.83 Importantly for the present discussion, he identifies one of 
the results of current articulations of the subject-object relationship – in theory 
and in practice – as the desire for ‘false clarity’. This is not simply a philosophical 
error but a real social pathology, the social manifestations of which range from 
superstition and conspiracy thinking (especially anti-Semitism) to the pursuit of 
transparency in architecture.84 The present section outlines Adorno’s approach 
to the subject-object relationship, the following considers the implications for 
understanding the role of the transparency ideal and conspiracy theorising in 
contemporary international politics. 
Before turning to Adorno, it is worth briefly considering some of the approaches 
to the subject-object dichotomy which IR scholars have drawn upon in responding 
to the risk of epistemic triumphalism identified above. Most Post-Positivist 
reflection in IR goes beyond historicisation in order to draw out key features of 
prevailing epistemic constellations which can then be subjected to critique. 
Poststructuralists and Critical Theorists have often done so by placing the 
subject-object relationship within context of a more fundamental intersubjectivity, 
thereby moving from the philosophy of the subject to the philosophy of language. 
In the case of Habermasian Critical Theory, the emphasis has been placed on 
intersubjective communicative reason. From this perspective, knowledge is not a 
matter of the correspondence between the subject’s concepts and an objective 
reality, but of the pursuit of communicatively arrived at agreement.85 For many 
Poststructuralists, following Derrida, the structure of language is such that 
successful representation of ‘real’ objects is impossible. This undermines the 
Western ‘metaphysics of presence’ according to which such signification, and 
therefore truth, is achievable.86 
Whatever form it takes, this intersubjectivism helps to sustain a sense of 
dynamism, tension or contradiction which goes some way to problematising the 
modern narrative of epistemic progress. It challenges naïve self-reflection and 
modern epistemic self-confidence by undermining the ‘quest for self-awareness 
83 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans.Edmund Jephcott 
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on the part of a stable, knowing self’87, on the one hand, and the idea of objective 
reality, on the other. Such reflexively-derived intersubjectivist challenges to the 
prevailing understandings of the subject-object relationship have provided the 
basis for critical accounts of international politics. For example, drawing on 
Habermas, Linklater identifies the ‘totalizing project’ of the modern nation state 
and challenges it with a communicative procedural universalism.88 Drawing on 
Derrida, David Campbell links political violence in Bosnia to the international 
community’s acceptance of the metaphysics of presence. Against this, he 
advocates an ethics of sensitivity to difference based on Derrida’s theory of 
writing.89  Richard Ashley’s criticisms of ‘heroic practice’, mentioned above, 
reflect a similar challenge to the theoretical and political implications of the 
subject-object dichotomy. In each case, the overarching socio-political and 
theoretical problem reflexivists confront is that of the reificatory implications of 
epistemic positions concerned with the relationship between the individual 
subject and objective reality. This is, in each case, challenged with a reflexively 
identified intersubjectivity which both enables and undermines the modern 
subject’s knowledge of objective reality.
This has been a productive strand of theorising, but Post-Positivist IR theory has 
been hobbled by an overwhelmingly hostile attitude to the notion of ‘objectivity’.90 
Whilst this has provided some means of destabilising prevailing epistemic 
assumptions, it has often done so at the cost of facilitating an implicit claim to 
insight into formal preconditions of knowledge. As Peter Dews has argued 
regarding Derrida’s theory, it tends to elevate the a priori over truth – or, in other 
words, claims about the fundamental structure of language over the investigation 
of historically contingent developments.91 Similar concerns have been raised 
about the formalistic nature of Habermasian Critical Theory.92 In either case, too 
87 Jürgen Habermas The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence 
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much insight is being claimed for reflection, and the real dilemmas and practices 
of modern individuals tend to be explained away as a result.
One possible response to such problems, and also to the danger, identified at the 
start of this section, of uncritically affirming epistemic ideals is to reject the 
emphasis on the epistemic altogether. Pursuing this line of argument, Scientific 
Realists working in IR have asserted that questions of knowledge are distinct 
from questions about international political reality.93 On this view, many Post-
Positivists commit what the late Roy Bhaskar referred to as the ‘epistemic fallacy’. 
In Bhaskar’s words, this is the mistake according to which it is assumed that 
‘statements about being can be reduced to statements about knowledge; i.e. that 
ontological questions can always be translated into epistemological terms’.94 
According to Scientific Realists working in IR, Post-Positivists reduce the real to 
the epistemic.95 The result is that
the world, which ought to be viewed as a multi-dimensional structure independent of man, [is] 
squashed into a flat surface whose characteristics, such as being constituted by atomistic facts, 
were determined by a particular concept of knowledge.96
The epistemic fallacy might even serve an ideological function. For example, 
Jonathan Joseph has suggested that the concern with reflexivity which 
characterises the critical social theory of thinkers such as Beck and Giddens is 
also an element in the strategies of neoliberal governance.97 The appropriate 
theoretical response, from a Realist perspective, is not to engage in further 
epistemic reflection, but to look for specific, real causal mechanisms. 
As we shall see, there is an ideological dimension to modern epistemic ideals. 
However, there is no unproblematic perspective from which to search for 
underlying causal mechanisms. Scientific Realists understand the objectivity of 
reality as a precondition of science, whilst failing to consider that this mode of 
experiencing the world has only emerged in the context of particular social 
conditions. That is to say, and as will be argued below, the way in which objectivity 
appears depends on specific articulations of the subject-object relationship which 
occur through the sorts of developments sketched above. Whilst Scientific 
93 Heikki Patomäki and Colin Wight, ‘After Post-Positivism? The Promises of Critical Realism’, 
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Patomäki (2000), p.217.
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Realists acknowledge variation in ways of knowing, they prioritise a model of 
knowledge in which the theorist can supposedly penetrate the veil of social 
appearances. Such an epistemology is not neutral – the same confidence in this 
form of knowledge is integral to transparency discourse and conspiracy thinking. 
Since, as suggested at the start of this section, such phenomena serve to 
uncritically promote the idea of modern, epistemically driven progress, Scientific 
Realists risk arriving back into the sort of epistemic hubris they seek to escape. 
A more convincing call for a non-Positivist account of objectivity has been made 
by Inanna Hamati-Ataya who argues that the development of a reflexivist IR 
theory with ‘cognitive impact’ requires a ‘radical move away from a priori 
normative foundations of classical epistemology’ in favour of a ‘strong reflexivity’ 
which criticises objectivism ‘from within’.98 From this perspective, following 
feminist standpoint epistemology, the problem with Positivist ‘objectivism’ is that 
it is not ‘objective’ enough, since it fails to take into account the inescapably 
contextual nature of knowledge.99 According to Hamati-Ataya a move beyond the 
subject-object dichotomy should be informed by social and naturalized 
epistemology.100 IR theorists must recognise ‘the fact that subjects of knowledge 
are embodied and socially located has the consequence that they are not 
fundamentally different from objects of knowledge.’101 
Adorno’s Critical Theory offers a means of developing a similar line of thinking in 
pursuit of cognitive impact. From Adorno’s perspective, IR theorists’ ongoing 
struggle with the subject-object relationship is not surprising, since the propensity 
of enlightened subjects to pursue various ways of making thought a ‘self-sufficient 
totality’ – i.e. to suppress recognition that they are indebted to something non-
subjective – was the abiding pathology of modern philosophy and society, one 
which is not easily rectified.102 In line with Hamati-Ataya’s attempt to rework 
objectivism from within, and with Scientific Realists’ criticisms of Post-Positivism, 
he insists on the ‘primacy of the object’ against the abstractions of subjectivism.103 
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In contrast with Scientific Realism, however, the hubris of subjectivism must be 
challenged by means of reflection rather than a renewed faith in scientific 
objectivity. Unlike the Habermasian and Poststructuralist theories examined 
above, on the other hand, the task of reflection is the relatively restricted one of 
reflecting on the tensions and contradictions of current epistemic principles rather 
than that of uncovering preconditions of knowledge and meaning operating at 
some more fundamental, intersubjective level. 
According to Adorno, in modern Western societies the subject has, in various 
ways, been elevated to the position of ‘dictator’ over things.104 In philosophical 
terms the starkest manifestation of this development is Positivism, which 
relegates anything which cannot be reduced to logic or empirically identifiable 
facts to a ‘knowledge-free zone’.105 This reflects a wider intellectual tendency, 
apparent in various ways in other philosophical traditions, according to which 
cognition appears to involve only that which is immanent to the enlightened 
subject’s system of classification and the concepts it employs, and in which 
unmediated knowledge is the ideal.106 Importantly for the purposes of the present 
paper, this philosophical trend has emerged hand in hand with social processes 
– especially capitalist commodification – through which the world, including 
human beings, is quantified and rendered into fungible units. The assumption that 
there is ‘no remainder’ when we engage with the world as rational, enlightened 
subjects is reflected in the key units with which modern societies operate – 
commodities, data, and individuals, as well as concepts. Whether in his role as 
philosopher or capitalist, the enlightened subject is driven by a suspicion of 
anything which cannot be captured with these abstract and interchangeable units. 
Although it has proved to be a highly effective means of controlling and therefore 
surviving in the natural world, this suspicion also reflects a fear of ‘social 
deviation’.107 It is a real of source of compulsion manifested in the institutions and 
structures which govern modern Western societies.108 Because the world does 
not go into such units without remainder, the result is reification and suffering, or 
‘damaged life’ – those institutions and structures are experienced as something 
alien and unresponsive.109 Ultimately, this explains why ‘enlightened’ and 
rationalised European society found itself, in Adorno’s day, descending into 
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unprecedented ‘barbarism’ – individuals were increasingly left with a purified, 
formalised subjectivity which provided very little basis for resisting cruelty and 
domination.
The approach Adorno proposes for disclosing identity thinking and its effects is 
‘negative dialectics,’ which aims to generate a ‘consistent sense of 
non-identity’.110. He explains that ‘[t]he name of dialectics says no more than that 
objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder, that they come 
to contradict the traditional norm of adequacy’. Philosophical reflection is vital to 
this project because it ‘extinguishes the autarky of the concept, strips the blindfold 
from our eyes’ and thereby reveals that thinking is ‘entwined with a non-
conceptual whole’.111 The aim is to point to the ‘constitutive character of the non-
conceptual in the concept’ and to move, tentatively, towards a new way of relating 
to the world which is not based solely on identity thinking.112 The goal is not to 
abandon identity thinking entirely, however; identification of some kind is integral 
to thought and it is a genuine achievement of the Enlightenment to have 
systematised it. To abandon it would represent a real regression.113 Rather, the 
as Peter Uwe Hohendahl has pointed out, the aim is to show by means of critique 
that ‘thought processes do not [simply] reproduce facts’ and that ‘as long as those 
processes continue, they open up possibilities’. In other words, the social 
deviation which identity thinking would obstruct remains possible. Negative 
thought therefore has a ‘utopian moment’ which belies the promise of the factual 
modes of thinking, including, as we shall see in a moment, those reflected in the 
pursuit of transparency and conspiracy.114 
Adorno’s reflection reveals that current forms of reason and cognition are 
‘indebted’ to something which they cannot fully encompass – the objective – and 
which they have a tendency to obscure.115 This objectivity is not the ‘dead’, value-
free reality associated with Positivism in IR, but encompasses the social totality 
which precedes the subject, the material world which the enlightened subject 
would subsume within its concepts, and the corporeal dimension of subjectivity 
itself – the subject as a ‘object also a subject.116 Importantly, however – and in 
keeping with Adorno’s refusal of the temptation to easily resolve or explain away 
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the subject-object problem – whilst the subject is also an object, the objective 
cannot be understood other than as it is mediated through subjectivity. This 
mutual mediation of subjectivity and objectivity leads Adorno to resist the 
temptation to give firm definitions of either. The closest he comes is the 
observation that
the concepts of what is subjective and what is objective have been completely reversed. Objective 
[supposedly] means the non-controversial side of things, their unquestioned impression, the 
façade made up of classified data, that is, the subjective; and they [mistakenly] call subjective 
anything which breaks through that façade, engages the specific experience of a matter, casts-
off all ready-made judgements and substitutes relatedness to the object for the majority opinion 
of those who do not even look at it, let alone think about it — that is, the objective.117
Whilst it is expressed in philosophical terms, this statement gives a sense of the 
fragile balance it is necessary to maintain in dealing with the subject-object 
relationship as it appears in epistemic phenomena of the kind under consideration 
in the present paper. On the one hand, modern individuals are presented with a 
society which increasingly operates through the circulation of ‘classified data’. 
Under these circumstances, they turn to epistemic ideals or projects promising 
access to data or the facts in the hope that in doing so they will come to 
understand or influence the structures with which they are faced. The resources 
with which the individual tends to approach this façade – relentless pursuit of the 
facts, the demand for access to information – are, however, wrongly taken to be 
those of the ‘objective’ pursuit of the truth. These are in fact the resources of 
subjects who have already been shaped by identity thinking and are losing sight 
of the possibility of particular experience and original judgment which would really 
be objective (insofar as they would avoid subjectivist reification). 
Unfortunately, then, the resources which appear to promise insight, progress, 
empowerment are the very bricks from which the impenetrable ‘façade’ of modern 
institutions is constructed. On the other hand, those aspects of experience and 
activity which still partly escape the systems thereby established – art, emotion, 
reflection, ethics, for example – are denigrated as merely ‘subjective’ and 
relegated to the cognition-free realm mentioned above.118 In fact, since these are 
things which are not easily rendered into classified data in accordance with 
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modern subjectivism, they potentially provide a better means of avoiding reified 
subjectivity and of illuminating its structures. To the extent that they have yet to 
be transferred to the ‘non-controversial’ side, such experiences and activities can 
give us cognitive purchase. To this extent they are more ‘objective’ than the 
resources offered by Positivism. 
Given this critique, in his efforts to avoid identity thinking whilst highlighting the 
primacy of the objective, Adorno must take care not to claim conventional 
objective insight – that is, to adopt the position of a subject who can capture the 
facts in an unproblematic manner. For this reason, as well as proceeding on the 
reflexive basis just described, he frequently ‘reads’ cultural or philosophical 
artefacts in a way which captures the currently reified nature of the subject-object 
relationship whilst maintaining a sense that it could be articulated otherwise that 
it is. From this perspective, a concept or theory can be ‘true’ to the extent that it 
reflects some dimension of existing social conditions, but false to the extent that 
it gives the impression of their permanence. For example, Positivism can be 
described as ‘true’ insofar as it is an expression of the atomistic, alienated form 
of social relations shaped by the calculative rationality of capitalist society. At the 
same time, it is ‘false’ because it is incapable of recognising the distortion these 
social relations involve.119 The subject-object distinction itself is ‘true’ to the extent 
that ‘in the cognitive realm it serves to express the real separation, the dichotomy 
of the human condition, a coercive development’. It is ‘false’ because ‘the 
resulting separation must not be hypostatised, not magically transformed into an 
invariant’.120 This approach captures the way in which, however reified it might 
have become, the subject-object relationship cannot be frozen but is, rather, 
always open to new articulations. 
The dangers of false clarity
Adorno’s critique of identity-thinking serves a ‘world-disclosing’ function – it 
reveals and denaturalises the operation of epistemic assumptions which are 
usually taken for granted, revealing that they retain the character of rigid myths 
or superstitions.121 More specifically, it undermines their implicit claim – identified 
at the start of the previous section – to represent a progression to a new epistemic 
stage based on ever less mediated knowledge. His approach to the subject-
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object relationship therefore provides the means of addressing the problems that 
have emerged in our attempt to provide an account of epistemic folkways in 
international politics. It gives a sense of what is distinctive about modern forms of 
knowledge – technically, normatively, politically, and existentially – whilst at the 
same time undermining the impression of epistemic progress which they tend to 
impose. It thereby rubs epistemic history against the grain in the manner the need 
for which was identified above. 
This was an important task for Adorno, for whom one of the primary social and 
political manifestations of identity thinking was the pursuit of ‘false clarity’. In 
keeping with the connection between enlightened thought and compulsion 
described above, the preface to Dialectic of Enlightenment, states that ‘[f]alse 
clarity is another name for myth’ which, it is pointed out, was always ‘obscure and 
luminous at once’.122 Like identity thinking in general, but in a manner similar to 
older forms of superstition, this modern clarity is maintained by ‘tabooing any 
thought which sets out negatively from the facts and from the prevailing modes 
of thought as obscure, convoluted, and preferably foreign’ and in doing so ‘holds 
mind captive in ever deeper blindness’.123 Moreover, the ‘concept of clarity’ to 
which ‘art, literature, and philosophy must conform’ is not neutral, but is defined 
by the ‘prevailing usages’ of knowledge in ‘science, business and politics.’124 
Dialectic of Enlightenment closes with a more specific warning about the dangers 
of pursuing false clarity and an indication of the ways in which they might 
materialise. A fragment entitled ‘Isolation by Communication’ describes the 
operation of clarity in more concrete terms. In this case it does not take the form 
of epistemological boundary-setting in support of technical knowledge, but of the 
transparency of material structures and relationships. The authors describe ‘the 
glass partitions of modern offices’ in which employees ‘can be easily supervised 
by the public and their managers’. Under such conditions – which, it is worth 
remembering are only more prevalent in the present day – uniformity can spread 
whilst the space for ‘private conversations and idylls’ disappears.125  The same 
theme is repeated elsewhere in Adorno’s work where we find references to 
‘society’s crystal-clear order’ and ‘cellophane shamelessness’, and to the modern 
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view ‘that the life and experience of the people… is a kind of glass case’ as a 
‘desperate abstraction’.126 
Far from being a source of progress, then, the idealisation and pursuit of 
unmediated knowledge – of ready access to information – is a modern myth 
which tends to entangle subjects in the reification described above. As an ideal 
and a practice, clarity is the manifestation of subjectivism in the experiences, 
structures and ideals of modern society. Its assertion is not only a matter of 
moulding cognition into a form conducive to technical success, but also of 
creating communities and individuals who present no obstacle to the pursuit of 
that same goal. The experience of those subjects and their interaction with one 
another becomes impoverished as a result. In the terms used in our historical 
sketch, the subject-object relationship is articulated in such a way that the 
prevailing forms of technical knowledge determine the pursuit of normative-
political progress and the terms of meaningful individual existence.
The reificatory implications of the pursuit of clarity is apparent in both the 
transparency ideal and conspiracy theorising. Contemporary claims about the 
importance of transparency reflect the fact that we live in a world in which 
technical, normative political, and existential spheres described earlier in the 
paper are shaped by the creation and circulation of the information. Certainly, 
within each of those strands, the absence of transparency is often experienced 
as a threat or obstacle. This is most obviously the case within the technical 
systems of global governance where it is important that the relevant actors have 
access to accurate information. As we have seen, transparency was also vital to 
the development of a modern public sphere which challenges traditional forms of 
authority. To this extent faith in transparency is ‘true’ in the Adornian sense 
described above – it reflects the realities of international power. 
It is ‘false’, however, to the extent that it reflects the assumption that knowledge 
and social interaction are necessarily matters of the circulation of data and that, 
in this form, they currently provide a source of political empowerment. As 
suggested above, this is not a simple historical ‘fact’ but reflects a particular form 
of knowledge and interaction which has proved to be effective and appealing in 
modern societies. The reduction of large sections of life to data necessary for the 
creation of such information involves procedures of epistemic boundary-setting 
which maintain structures indifferent to the needs and experiences of the 
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individuals whose lives they govern. It is far from clear that transparency 
necessarily escapes or successfully subverts this purified form of cognition. 
Whilst individual instances of increased transparency achieved by campaigners 
– of ‘plugging-in’ to information-based systems – will often prove empowering, 
they provide no model for more general international empowerment since 
individuals will still be confronted with institutions run on the basis of the 
manipulation of data. As argued above, this is to a great extent the source of 
disempowerment in the first place. The ideal of transparency plays a role in 
driving this process onwards.
The dangers in question are apparent in the extent to which many of the 
international institutions and systems which transparency apparently promises to 
transform are already maintained on the basis of transparency. The following 
statement from the International Monetary Fund is suggestive of the problem:
Fiscal transparency… is a critical element of effective fiscal management. Fiscal transparency 
helps ensure that governments’ economic decisions are informed by a shared and accurate 
assessment of the current fiscal position, the costs and benefits of any policy changes, and the 
potential risks to the fiscal outlook. Fiscal transparency also provides legislatures, markets, and 
citizens with the information they need to make efficient financial decisions and to hold 
governments to account for their fiscal performance and their utilization of public resources. 
Finally, fiscal transparency facilitates international surveillance of fiscal developments and helps 
mitigate the transmission of fiscal spillovers between countries.127
Whilst it acknowledges the importance of public accountability, the view of 
transparency presented here is largely that of a means to ‘efficiency’ and effective 
‘management’ based on ‘accuracy’ and ‘information’. These might be important 
goals, but under present conditions they are distinct from those of popular political 
empowerment. The form of epistemic activity being promoted is one in which the 
world is purged of obstacles to the smooth running of technical systems, in this 
case the global financial system – precisely the subjective abstraction which 
Adorno feared was taking hold in practice as well as in theory. 
As with transparency, it is possible to ‘read’ conspiracy-thinking as a cultural 
phenomenon with cognitive content – as both true and false in a manner which 
captures the ongoing articulation of the subject-object relationship. Conspiracy 
thinking is more obviously ‘false’ insofar as it takes the pursuit of information and 
rationalisation of the world to even further extremes. That such thinking does so 
has long been noted. Hofstadter explains that ‘paranoid scholarship’
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is nothing if not coherent – in fact, the paranoid mentality is far more coherent than the 
real world, since it leaves no room for mistakes, failures, or ambiguities. It is, if not wholly 
rational, at least intensely rationalistic; it believes that it is up against an enemy who is 
as infallibly rational as he is totally evil, and it seeks to match his imputed total 
competence with its own, leaving nothing unexplained and comprehending all of reality 
in one overreaching consistent theory.128
Conspiracy theories and other forms of paranoid thinking imbue the world with 
coherence, purging it of all that is ambiguous or accidental by focusing on facts 
and rational subjectivity. As Hofstadter points out, this is a highly rationalistic 
erasure of contingency according to which the world is shaped through rational 
actions. Each of these tendencies is, of course, at odds with good scientific 
practice which has always emphasised contingency and the need for critical 
interpretation of facts. However, conspiracy thinking is scientistic insofar as it 
reflects unquestioning faith that empiricism and rationalism provide the basis 
upon which progress or insight will be achieved. Like all scientism, it is a 
caricature of science.
Adorno identified a similarly scientistic combination of hyper-empiricism and 
hyper-rationalism in his analysis of the astrology column of the Los Angeles 
Times. He places such superstition within the same epistemic constellation as 
Positivism, in which any space for reflection has been squeezed-out:
with the ever-increasing belief in “facts,” information has a tendency to replace intellectual 
penetration and reflection. The element of “synthesis” in the classical philosophical sense seems 
to be more and more lacking; there is, on the one hand, a wealth of material and knowledge, but 
the relationship is more one of formal order and classification than one which would open up the 
supposedly stubborn facts by interpretation and understanding…129 
This squeezing out of the space for reflection and interpretation is also apparent 
in the Anti-Semitic conspiracy theories which accompanied the rise of fascism. 
According to Adorno and Horkheimer, Anti-Semitism is the behaviour of ‘blinded 
people, deprived of subjectivity, are let loose as subjects’, It is a pathology in 
which subjects are ‘passively succumbing to the dazzlement of false 
immediacy’.130 Because the exploitation involved in the capitalist system is not 
immediately apparent, the Anti-Semite looks to the immediately available 
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scapegoat.131 The role of false clarity in Anti-Semitism reflects the loss of 
judgment and of the capacity for active cognition and their replacement by 
readymade categories and stereotypes, a process which reflects the reification 
involved in enlightened thinking in general. A similar pattern is apparent in 
contemporary conspiracy theories, where active reflection and interpretation are 
rejected in favour of collection of ‘the facts’ and accounts of the world in terms of 
readymade stereotypes, villains, and scapegoats such as ‘mainstream media’ or 
‘illuminati’. 
Just as with the ideal of transparency, however, there is an important truth to 
conspiracy thinking. Like transparency it reflects the reality of an information 
society in which faith in clarity has been elevated to the status of a political ideal 
and defining feature of individual identity. More importantly – and in contrast with 
most discussions of transparency – because conspiracy theorists do not believe 
the sources of clarity to lie in prevailing institutions, their attitude reflects the 
reality that many of the current structures of governance are experienced by large 
numbers of people as unresponsive or as a threat, and that this cannot be 
rectified simply by means of access to the information institutions themselves 
provide. In other words, it reflects the truth that technical knowledge is generally 
used to promote goals other than popular empowerment, that institutions of global 
governance are experienced as malicious or indifferent actors, and that the 
normative-political resources of the public sphere are severely depleted when it 
comes to dealing with them.132 Perhaps most importantly, it reflects the possibility 
that the means of rejuvenating that sphere might lie elsewhere than within 
existing institutions and their transparency policies.
Nevertheless, conspiracy thinking does draw upon the same epistemic resources 
as the technical practices of modern institutions, which strive to create a coherent 
and therefore controllable reality by generating information and facilitating its 
circulation. For this reason it is not fundamentally counter-cultural. The 
fundamental problem is not simply the crude scientism and rationalism reflected 
in conspiracy theories, but their participation in the purification of reason in 
practice such that the space available for reflection and interpretation – creative 
thinking – diminishes. The problem is not, ultimately, that conspiracy theorists 
lend coherence to a society which is in fact characterised by contingency – the 
success of identity thinking is such that this is not the case in any simple sense – 
but that, like the advocates of transparency, they accept many of the sources of 
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the disempowerment they want to address. Conspiracy theories reduce the public 
dimension of reflection identified in the first section of this paper to the 
identification rather than the interpretation of facts and to the imputation of a 
malevolent subjectivity operating behind the scenes. At the level of the existential 
dimension of modernity, conspiracy theorising serves the same consoling 
function as does technical knowledge according to Dialectic of Enlightenment; a 
world free from contingency and uncertainty is an appealing one to modern 
individuals, who are increasingly at the mercy of distant and obscure structures. 
In his article on astrology, Adorno writes that:
[I]t may well be said that astrology presents the bill for the neglect of interpretative thinking for the 
sake of fact gathering.133
The same might be said of faith in transparency and the acceptance of conspiracy 
theories. Both reflect an assumption that access to hidden information will offer 
some form of empowerment in the face of unresponsive, exploitative, or 
restrictive institutions and structures. In particular cases this can be true. 
However, at a more general level, upon close inspection, the empowerment in 
question turns out to extend the influence of a specific form of technical 
knowledge which operates by excluding and suppressing the concrete and 
particular. At the level of individual and collective empowerment – the existential 
and normative-political spheres identified above – the result is a vicious circle; 
empowerment in relation to institutions maintained on the basis of technical 
knowledge is pursued by further extending the reach of that form of knowledge. 
To the extent that it is assumed that access to more information simply is 
empowering, the circle is concealed. The utopian dimension of thought is equated 
with less mediated access to data.
Adorno identifies this tendency to assume that problems will be resolved for those 
with access to the facts as a recurring feature in modern culture:
the threat-help pattern of the [astrology] column is closely related to devices more generally 
spread through contemporary mass culture… While there are continuous hints of conflict and 
unpleasantness, it implies that whoever is aware of these situations will somehow be taken care 
of.134
‘Somehow’ here stands in for the possibilities for collective and individual 
knowledge and reflection which are being killed-off through the progression of 
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identity thinking, but through which individuals and groups might begin to 
understand how to construct a world in which their interests really were taken 
care of. The appeal of this ‘somehow’ – the idea that through ready access to 
information we are empowered – is particularly strong in the international sphere, 
where structures for ensuring that the interests of citizens are ‘taken care of’ are 
even more lacking than elsewhere. It suggests a void at the heart of 
contemporary epistemic folkways and their manifestations, recognition of which 
must be added to any attempt to provide insight into the contemporary 
international politics of knowledge. 
Conclusion
The transparency ideal and conspiracy theorising both reflect the epistemic 
folkways with which contemporary international politics is often approached in the 
supposed ‘information age’. The sketch outlined in Part I pointed to the historical 
specificity of such ways of knowing and to their relationship to the technical, 
normative-political, and existential dimensions of modern politics and society. 
The negotiation of the subject-object relationship was at the heart of these 
developments. Telling this story turned out to be no simple matter, however. The 
ideas about knowledge reflected in transparency and conspiracy rest on 
assumptions about epistemically driven progress which our historical sketch 
risked uncritically promoting. The subject-object relationship is a problem for 
theorists too – they participate in the processes they seek to describe. Adorno’s 
reflexive reworking of this relationship provides a means of critically 
understanding the subject-object relationship as it appears in theory and in 
practice. It reveals that there is something pathological as well as progressive in 
the way it has been articulated in modern societies. The picture that emerges is 
that of the widespread acceptance and influence of subjectivist principles and, 
unwittingly, of their reificatory implications. 
The purified, subjectivist reason described by Adorno is at the heart of 
contemporary epistemic folkways. In terms of the normative-political and 
existential dimensions described above, the tragedy is that actors implicitly 
recognise the utopian moment in thought – the possibility that it might not be 
confined to the structures and forms offered by modern bureaucracies and 
markets – and therefore pursue ‘thought processes’ which they hope will lead 
beyond current political realities. This element of utopianism is apparent in the 
pursuit of both transparency and conspiracy theories, and no doubt explains their 
appeal. However, in taking the epistemic folkways in question, individuals draw 
on the resources offered by identity thinking, thereby undermining their own 
efforts.  This vicious circle belies the impression of epistemic progress which 
accounts of the unique epistemic features of Western modernity, declarations 
that we live in an information age, the transparency ideal, and conspiracy 
theorising all promote. Whilst modern forms of subjectivity are undeniably new 
and distinct, they represent a persistent form of compulsion which is in important 
respects not fundamentally different from the modes of ‘superstitious’ thought and 
traditional authority against which the Enlightenment has defined itself. In other 
words, the tale of progression to a new, epistemically more sophisticated era is 
only one strand of a paradoxical story. Only through reflection can we recognise 
that the simultaneous truth and falsity of this narrative. 
This suggests that IR scholars should think carefully before turning their backs 
on epistemic reflection. The overtly epistemic terms in which international politics 
is conducted and in which large numbers of ordinary people engage with it point 
to the continuing significance of the questions about knowledge introduced into 
IR by reflexivists. That strand of theorising was never pursued simply as an 
exercise in philosophy or metatheory but was an integral part of attempts to 
understand the implications of the modern epistemic constellation for 
international politics. The sorts of epistemological questions associated with 
meta-theory are inextricably linked to some of the most substantive of 
contemporary international problems.
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